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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
Nos. 15-3638, 16-1736 
____________ 
 
HERSON ROBERTO GRANADOS, 
     Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                            Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order 
 of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A078-694-038) 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 18, 2017 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 26, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Herson Roberto Granados petitions for review of an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his application for protection under the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss 
the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
I 
 Granados, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without 
inspection in 2000. In 2010, he was convicted in New Jersey of robbery under N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:15-1, resulting in a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. The Department of 
Homeland Security then sought his removal from the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an inadmissible person who entered the United States without 
admission or parole, and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an inadmissible person 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Granados conceded removability on the 
first charge, and an Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the second charge and found him 
removable. 
 Granados sought deferral of removal under the CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17, claiming 
that if he were returned to El Salvador, he would be tortured by MS-13 gang members 
because he is a former MS-13 member with visible gang tattoos.1 Specifically, he claimed 
that he fled El Salvador after he ceased participating in the gang and received threats of 
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torture and death by MS-13 members. After settling in New Jersey, Granados 
encountered members of MS-13 and began tattooing his body with MS-13 symbols to 
prove his loyalty. He later moved to another part of New Jersey and stopped associating 
with MS-13 members. While in prison on his robbery conviction, however, he obtained 
more gang tattoos and continued to associate with gang members for his own safety. 
Granados testified that he is no longer a member of MS-13. 
 On July 1, 2015, the IJ denied Granados’s CAT claim and ordered him removed to 
El Salvador. The IJ determined that his robbery conviction was both a crime of moral 
turpitude and a particularly serious crime, and that he was therefore ineligible for 
withholding of removal under the CAT. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(d)(2). The IJ further concluded that, although Granados was eligible to apply 
for deferral of removal under the CAT, he had not demonstrated that such relief was 
warranted.  
The IJ found Granados’s testimony credible and concluded that it was more likely 
than not that he would be subjected to torture by MS-13 members if returned to El 
Salvador. The IJ noted several threats to kill, beat, or stab Granados and an expert’s report 
stating that gangs will violently punish someone who flees. Nevertheless, the IJ 
concluded: “while [Granados] is threatened with likely torture by the MS-13 in El 
Salvador, he is ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT because he has failed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Although Granados originally filed for asylum and withholding of removal, he 
later withdrew those applications during removal proceedings and asserted through 
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demonstrate public officials’ acquiescence or consent to his torture.” A.R. 44. 
Specifically, the IJ found that “the Salvadoran police are aware of gang violence 
constituting torture and are taking meaningful steps to combat it,” noting that Granados 
had presented evidence of “the Salvadoran police’s escalating campaign against gangs.” 
A.R. 43. 
Granados appealed to the BIA, challenging only the denial of his deferral of 
removal. On October 27, 2015, the BIA dismissed the appeal. It found no clear error in 
the IJ’s determination that Granados failed to meet his burden of proof to show that, if 
returned to El Salvador, he would experience torture “inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.” A.R. 3 (quoting A.R. 9). Granados filed a timely petition for review.2  
II 
 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction to 
review final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Although we may not review a 
final order of removal against a petitioner who is removable for committing a criminal 
offense listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), which includes crimes involving moral turpitude, 
we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 
                                                                                                                                                             
counsel that he was only seeking CAT protection. 
2 Granados later filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings based on 
changed country conditions, which the BIA denied as untimely. Granados then filed a 
second petition for review, which was consolidated with his prior petition. In his brief on 
appeal, Granados withdraws his second petition for review and proceeds only on his 
initial petition. 
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U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D). Where the BIA’s decision “invokes specific aspects of the 
IJ’s analysis and factfinding in support of the BIA’s conclusions” as it did here, we 
review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA. Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
Granados first argues that the BIA and IJ failed to consider evidence relating to his 
claim that the police would not protect him as a former gang member. Granados is correct 
that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” must be considered in 
reviewing a CAT application. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). But the record here shows that 
the IJ and BIA considered evidence relating to the El Salvadoran government’s treatment 
of Granados and other gang members, yet did not find that the police would consent to or 
acquiesce in any harm inflicted on Granados or fail to protect him. In particular, the IJ 
considered Granados’s testimony and other evidence of the police’s treatment of gang 
members—including State Department, expert, and media reports—but found that 
Salvadoran officials were taking meaningful steps to address gang violence. Moreover, 
the IJ found that Granados had not “provided evidence that it is in fact the policy or 
practice of the police to deny protection to former gang members,” and the BIA held that 
this finding was not clearly erroneous. A.R. 4, 43 (emphasis added). Indeed, Granados 
concedes on appeal that “no evidence was presented demonstrating that the Salvadoran 
police have a policy or practice of acquiescence.” Granados Br. 19. “It is therefore 
apparent that [Granados]’s real argument is not that relevant evidence was ignored, but 
rather that the IJ incorrectly weighed evidence in making factual determinations. . . . [W]e 
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lack jurisdiction to consider such an argument.” Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 508 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
Granados also argues that the BIA failed to consider evidence that he was tortured 
in the past, which is relevant to the possibility of future torture. However, both the BIA 
and IJ found that Granados will likely be targeted for harm, but not by or with the consent 
or acquiescence of the Salvadoran government. Again, we lack jurisdiction to review this 
factual conclusion. See id. at 507 (“[W]e lack jurisdiction to consider Green’s argument 
that the IJ erred in determining that the Jamaican government would not consent to or 
acquiesce in the Shower Posse’s actions.”). 
Finally, Granados argues that the BIA and IJ applied an incorrect legal standard for 
evaluating Granados’s claims. Specifically, he claims that the BIA and IJ imposed a 
“stringent and inappropriate” standard of acquiescence upon him “by requiring him to 
demonstrate that it is the policy or practice of the police to deny protection to former gang 
members.” Granados Br. 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). As an initial matter, 
Granados failed to raise this argument before the BIA and has therefore failed to exhaust 
this claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 
2012) (requiring administrative exhaustion as a jurisdictional prerequisite). In any event, 
neither the BIA nor the IJ required Granados to provide evidence of such policy or 
practice as a matter of law. Instead, they merely responded to Granados’s claim that the 
police would not protect him as a former gang member by noting that he failed to present 
evidence of any policy or practice of such selective law enforcement. 
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In sum, Granados has raised what amounts to a disagreement with the agency’s 
factual determination that he failed to sufficiently demonstrate that public officials in El 
Salvador would likely consent to or acquiesce in his torture, and this argument is 
unreviewable. See Green, 694 F.3d at 507; Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 
303, 309 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
